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THE CONTINUING CONUNDRUM OF 
INTERNATIONAL INTERNET 
JURISDICTION 
Kevin A. Meehan* 
Abstract: International law has long been concerned with resolving issues 
of international jurisdiction; however, the unique circumstances involved 
in Internet cases have thrown a wrench in the traditional machinery of 
international jurisdiction law. Domestic courts continue to struggle with 
the issue, and the international community has dragged its feet on devel-
oping a uniform standard for determining international Internet jurisdic-
tion. Further complicating matters, states often have divergent substantive 
Internet regulations and policies. This Note discusses and analyzes the 
leading cases and theories on international Internet jurisdiction and con-
cludes that none of the current proposed solutions alone provide a satis-
factory solution. Nevertheless, an international resolution on internet ju-
risdiction that borrows elements from each of these proposals could be 
successfully established. 
Introduction 
 Over the last decade, the Internet has exploded, making our world 
smaller.1 The touch of a few keystrokes enables people to communi-
cate, engage in commerce, and interact with others around the world.2 
This ability to cross international borders without leaving one’s living 
room has created a jurisdictional void that has yet to be filled.3 When 
an international Internet conflict arises, several difficult questions must 
be answered: Where can the plaintiff sue? Which country’s laws apply?4 
Although these questions are not unique to Internet cases, the circum-
stances typically involved in such cases have made answers and consen-
                                                                                                                      
* Kevin A. Meehan is an Articles Editor for the Boston College International & Compara-
tive Law Review. 
1 See Tim Gerlach, Note, Using Internet Content Filters to Create E-Borders to Aid Interna-
tional Choice of Law and Jurisdiction, 26 Whittier L. Rev. 899, 899 (2005). 
2 See id. 
3 See id. 
4 See id. at 900. 
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sus opinion far more difficult than in traditional international jurisdic-
tion cases.5 
 Courts and commentators have long recognized these problems, 
yet little progress has been made toward finding a solution to the 
Internet jurisdiction dilemma.6 The failure of the legal community to 
develop jurisdictional standards has created significant concerns in the 
Internet community.7 Many Internet content providers are faced with 
the uncertainty of being sued in unanticipated jurisdictions for violat-
ing unknown laws with untold consequences.8 Their fear is grounded 
in a reality demonstrated by a Brazilian court order entered against 
Google subsidiary YouTube, which resulted in at least one Brazilian 
telecom company blocking the site from its Internet users.9 Although 
the judge vacated his order shortly after the ban went into effect, this 
libel case demonstrates the enormous impact Internet jurisdiction can 
have on e-commerce.10 
 Although the Internet is still relatively young, the legal principles 
of international jurisdiction are not. This Note begins with a brief ex-
planation of traditional (non-Internet related) international jurisdic-
tion law. Next, this Note summarizes the leading case involving inter-
national Internet jurisdiction and the leading theories for resolving its 
open issues. Finally, this Note suggests that, although alone they are 
each insufficient, aspects from each of these theories should be com-
bined for a practical and comprehensive approach to international 
Internet jurisdiction. 
I. Background 
A. Introduction to International Jurisdiction 
 The right of a sovereign state to create and enforce laws concern-
ing activities within its borders is a fundamental principle of interna-
                                                                                                                      
5 See Denis Rice, 2001: A Cyberspace Odyssey Through U.S. and E.U. Internet Jurisdiction over E-
Commerce, 661 PLI/Pat 421, 445 (2001). 
6 See Gerlach, supra note 1, at 902–03. 
7 See Holger Hestermeyer, Personal Jurisdiction for Internet Torts, 26 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 
267, 267–68 (2006). 
8 See id. at 268. 
9 See Associated Press, YouTube’s Legal Woes; Clip of Model Having Sex Ordered Blocked, 
Wash. Post, Jan. 8, 2007, at C3. 
10 See Jack Chang, Order to Ban YouTube Ignites Brazil Firestorm, Seattle Times, Jan. 14, 
2007, at A18. 
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tional law,11 yet there is often ambiguity as to whether such sovereign 
powers may extend beyond a state’s borders.12 As a result, the corpus 
juris concerning international jurisdiction is among the most volumi-
nous in all of international law and acknowledges several bases of juris-
diction.13 
 The strongest basis for a state’s jurisdiction is territoriality.14 Un-
der this principle, a sovereign state necessarily has jurisdiction over all 
persons, objects, and activities within its borders.15 
 Although inherently weaker, several bases of extraterritorial ju-
risdiction are also acknowledged by the international community, 
such as nationality, passive personality, effects, protection, and univer-
sality principles.16 The nationality principle permits states to assert 
jurisdiction over their own nationals, wherever they are located.17 This 
principle is grounded in the relationship existing between states and 
their nationals in which citizens are subject to their state’s laws be-
cause they enjoy the benefits of citizenship and have notice of the laws 
of their home state.18 
 Similarly, jurisdiction has been based on the nationality of the vic-
tim; however, such “passive personality” jurisdiction is not favored.19 
Another common basis of extraterritorial jurisdiction is effects jurisdic-
tion.20 Under this principle, a state may assert jurisdiction over conduct 
that has an effect, but does not actually occur, within its border.21 In 
addition, jurisdiction has been upheld under the protection principle 
where extraterritorial conduct directly threatened crucial state inter-
ests, such as national security.22 Lastly, under the universality principle, 
                                                                                                                      
11 See The Lotus Case (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18–19; see also Am. 
Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 358 (1909) (“The very meaning of sover-
eignty is that the decree of the sovereign makes law.”). 
12 See Mark W. Janis & John Noyes, International Law 767 (3d ed. 2006) (noting 
that jurisdictional issues constitute a large amount of international law). 
13 See id. 
14 See Mark W. Janis, An Introduction to International Law 318 (4th ed. 2003). 
15 See Am. Banana Co., 213 U.S. at 357–58 (explaining that power to make laws defines 
sovereignty and “[a]ll legislation is prima facie territorial”). 
16 See Janis, supra note 14, at 320, 322, 325. 
17 See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437 (1932). 
18 See id. at 438. 
19 See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 402 cmt. g (1987). 
20 See id. cmt. d. 
21 See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945). 
22 See United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1968). 
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certain activities are by their very nature jus cogens,23 and any nation 
may have jurisdiction over them.24 
 In many cases, a number of states may have concurrent jurisdiction 
under any of the various forms of extraterritorial jurisdiction, resulting 
in a conflict of laws.25 Forum selection clauses in international business 
contracts have become an increasingly important and accepted method 
of resolving international conflict of laws issues in the world of global 
commerce.26 Outside of this arena, however, there are two doctrines 
commonly used by courts to resolve international conflicts of laws: in-
ternational comity, and forum non conveniens.27 International comity is 
the recognition that a nation grants to the legislative, executive, or ju-
dicial acts of another nation within its own territory.28 Under this doc-
trine, a court may recognize and enforce a judgment of a foreign 
court,29 apply the laws of another state,30 or decline to assert its other-
wise valid jurisdiction and dismiss the complaint in favor of a foreign 
forum.31 Under the forum non conveniens doctrine, a court can dismiss a 
case if it finds that it would not be a sufficiently convenient forum for 
adjudication.32 
B. International Internet Jurisdiction 
1. The Internet Problem 
 Although the above legal framework worked relatively well in tradi-
tional contexts, the advent of the Internet introduced novel challenges 
                                                                                                                      
23 Jus cogens is “a mandatory or peremptory norm of general international law ac-
cepted and recognized by the international community as a norm from which no deroga-
tion is permitted. A peremptory norm can be modified only by a later norm that has the 
same character.” Black’s Law Dictionary 876 (8th ed. 2004); see also Milena Sterio, The 
Evolution of International Law, 31 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 213, 222–23 (2008) (discuss-
ing universal jurisdiction). 
24 See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding jurisdiction 
could be asserted over torturer because extraterritorial conduct violated universal norms). 
25 See Janis, supra note 14, at 326. 
26 See M/S Bremen v. Zapata, 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972). 
27 See Janis, supra note 14, at 326–27, 332. 
28 See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1895). 
29 See Janis, supra note 14, at 327. 
30 See Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 592 (1953) (holding Danish law applied in 
maritime tort case brought by Danish sailor). 
31 See M/S Bremen, 407 U.S. at 8–9 (sending litigation to London per forum selection 
clause). 
32 See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 248–49 (1981). 
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for determining international jurisdiction.33 In the traditional analog 
world, it is relatively easy for courts to determine the geographical loca-
tions of the persons, objects, and activities relevant to a particular 
case.34 The geography of the digital world of the Internet, however, is 
not as easily charted.35 Content providers may physically reside, con-
duct their business, and locate their servers in a particular location, yet 
their content is readily accessible from anywhere in the world.36 Fur-
thermore, attempts to identify the location of a particular user over the 
Internet have proven extremely difficult, and many Internet users 
compound this problem by intentionally hiding their location.37 Tradi-
tional principles of international jurisdiction, particularly territoriality, 
are poorly suited for this sort of environment of geographic anonym-
ity.38 Courts have struggled to develop a satisfactory solution,39 yet no 
progress has been made toward a uniform global standard of Internet 
jurisdiction.40 
2. Jurisdiction in Yahoo! v. La Ligue le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme 
 Perhaps the most highly publicized example of jurisdictional diffi-
culties involving the Internet is Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue le Racisme et 
L’Antisemitisme (LICRA), a case that started in 2000.41 Two French citi-
zens, LICRA, and L’Union Des Estudiants Juifs De France (UEJF), filed 
suit in France against Yahoo!, alleging that the website violated a 
French law prohibiting the display of Nazi paraphernalia by permitting 
users of its Internet auction service to display and sell such artifacts.42 
 The two Paris based anti-racism groups demanded that Yahoo!’s 
French subsidiary (Yahoo.fr) remove all hyperlinks to the parent web-
site (Yahoo.com) containing the offending content, and warn French 
                                                                                                                      
33 See Catherine Heaven, Note, A Proposal for Removing Road Blocks from the Information 
Superhighway by Using Integrated International Approach to Internet Jurisdiction, 10 Minn. J. 
Global Trade 373, 397 (2001). 
34 See Rice, supra note 5, at 429. 
35 See id. 
36 See Rinat Hadas, International Internet Jurisdiction: Whose Law is Right?, 15 Fla. J. Int’l 
L. 299, 307 (2002); Michelle Love, Note, International Jurisdiction over the Internet, 17 Temp. 
Int’l & Comp. L.J. 261, 262 (2003). 
37 See Rice, supra note 5, at 458–59 (explaining geo-location technologies). 
38 See id. at 429. 
39 See id. 
40 See Gerlach, supra note 1, at 902–03. 
41 See  Hestermeyer, supra note 7, at 268. 
42 See Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme (Yahoo! I), 145 F. Supp. 2d 
1168, 1171–72 (N.D. Cal. 2001). 
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surfers of the offending content accessible on Yahoo.com.43 In de-
fense, Yahoo! argued that the French court lacked jurisdiction over 
the matter because its servers were located in the United States, its 
principle business was located there, and it had no intention of violat-
ing the French law prohibiting the display of Nazi paraphernalia by 
linking Yahoo.com to Yahoo.fr.44 
 In a preliminary order, dated May 22, 2000 (the May Order), the 
Tribunal De Grande Instance De Paris rejected Yahoo!’s arguments.45 
The court held that it could properly assert jurisdiction because “the 
damage was suffered in France.”46 The May Order required Yahoo!: (1) 
to “dissuade and render impossible all visitation on Yahoo.com to par-
ticipate in the auction service of Nazi objects, as well as to render im-
possible any other site or service which makes apologies of Nazism”; (2) 
to warn all surfers on Yahoo.fr that the display or sale of Nazi objects as 
well as the “banalization” of Nazism is strictly forbidden in France and 
exposure to such illegal material is possible by using the hyperlink to 
Yahoo.com or by conducting certain searches; (3) to submit to the 
court at a later hearing their proposed measures for implementing the 
previous two orders; and (4) to pay each plaintiff 10,000 francs.47 
 During the subsequent hearing, Yahoo! again challenged the 
French Tribunal’s jurisdiction to consider the matter.48 Yahoo! also ar-
gued that compliance with the May Order would violate its First 
Amendment rights to freedom of expression, and, therefore, it could 
not be enforced in the United States.49 Yahoo! further claimed that 
compliance with the order would be technologically impossible.50 Fi-
nally, it argued that, even if it could comply with the May Order, imple-
menting it “would entail unduly high costs for the company . . . and 
would to a degree compromise the existence of the Internet, being a 
                                                                                                                      
43 See Richard Salis, A Look at How U.S. Based Yahoo! Was Condemned by French Law (Nov. 
2000), http://www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/cti/yauctions.htm. 
44 See id. 
45 See Tribunal de grande instance [T.G.I.] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, 
May 22, 2000, Interim Order No. 00/05308, available at http://www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/ 
cti/yauctions20000522.htm (Fr.). 
46 Id. 
47 Id. At the time the judgment was awarded, 10,000 francs would exchange for 
$13,460. See Daily French Franc Rate Against the Dollar, http://www.jeico.co.kr/ 
cnc57frc.html (lasted visited May 14, 2007). 
48 See Tribunal de grande instance [T.G.I.] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, 
Nov. 20, 2000, available at http://www.cdt.org/speech/international/20001120yahoofrance. 
pdf (Fr.). 
49 See id. 
50 See id. 
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space of liberty and scarcely receptive to attempts to control and restrict 
access.”51 
 In November, the court again rejected Yahoo!’s jurisdiction ar-
guments on the same grounds as in the May Order.52 Relying heavily 
on a report of Internet experts, it also rejected Yahoo!’s technological 
impossibility argument, and devoted much of its opinion to explain-
ing how compliance with the May Order could be achieved.53 In re-
jecting the First Amendment argument, the court stated that “it would 
most certainly cost the company very little to extend its ban to sym-
bols of Nazism, and such an initiative would also have the merit of sat-
isfying an ethical and moral imperative shared by all democratic socie-
ties.”54 The court then ordered Yahoo! to comply with the May Order 
within three months of receiving notice of the November Order.55 
 In response to the November Order, Yahoo! initiated suit in Cali-
fornia against LICRA and UEJF, seeking a declaratory judgment that 
the French orders were constitutionally unenforceable in the United 
States as contrary to the First Amendment.56 In an initial opinion, the 
district court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of ju-
risdiction.57 The district court first determined that the case was ripe 
for adjudication,58 and then turned to the International Shoe personal 
jurisdiction analysis.59 
 The court held that the defendants purposefully availed them-
selves of the forum state because they sent a “cease and desist” letter to 
Yahoo!’s California headquarters, requested the French court to re-
quire Yahoo! to take specific actions in California that would violate 
Yahoo!’s First Amendment rights, and engaged U.S. Marshals to serve 
process on Yahoo!.60 The court then determined that it would not be 
unreasonable to maintain Yahoo!’s suit, noting that the United States 
                                                                                                                      
51 Id. 
52 See id. 
53 Tribunal de grande instance [T.G.I.] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, 
Nov. 20, 2000, available at http://www.cdt.org/speech/international/20001120yahoofrance. 
pdf (Fr.). 
54 Id. 
55 See id. 
56 See Yahoo! I, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1171–72 (N.D. Cal. 2001). 
57 Id. at 1171. 
58 See id. at 1172 n.2. 
59 See id. at 1172–73. The Due Process Clause permits courts to assert jurisdiction over 
a non-resident defendant only if that defendant has “minimum contacts” with the forum 
state such that adjudication there “does not offend traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
60 See Yahoo! I, 145 F.3d at 1174. 
352 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 31:345 
was a superior forum to France for determining the limited question of 
whether it “should recognize and enforce the French Order that re-
quired Yahoo! to censor its U.S.-based service to conform to French 
penal law.”61 
 In a subsequent opinion, the district court granted Yahoo!’s mo-
tion for summary judgment and declared the French Orders unen-
forceable.62 Addressing the issue of international comity, the court rea-
soned that, although U.S. courts will generally recognize and enforce a 
foreign judgment, it could not do so in this case because enforcement 
of the French orders would violate Yahoo!’s constitutional rights “by 
chilling protected speech that occurs simultaneously within our bor-
ders.”63 
 LICRA and UEJF appealed and a divided panel of the Ninth Cir-
cuit reversed.64 The majority held the district court lacked jurisdiction 
over LICRA and UEJF because they had not engaged in wrongful con-
duct targeted at the forum state.65 The majority further noted that Ya-
hoo! cannot expect to have both the commercial benefits of having its 
content viewed worldwide as well as the benefit of using the First 
Amendment as a shield against foreign litigants seeking to enforce 
judgments based on foreign speech laws.66 In an en banc rehearing, an 
8-3 majority of the court upheld the district court’s exercise of jurisdic-
tion over LICRA and UEJF; however, the district court’s judgment was 
ultimately reversed on the ripeness issue.67 
II. Discussion 
A. Theories of Internet Regulation 
 As the last century drew to a close, the Internet was becoming a 
global phenomenon,68 yet the swelling scale of online commerce and 
                                                                                                                      
61 Id. at 1178, 1179–80. 
62 See Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme (Yahoo! II), 169 F. Supp. 2d 
1181, 1194 (N.D. Cal. 2001). 
63 Id. at 1192. 
64 See Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme (Yahoo! III), 379 F.3d 1120, 
1126 (9th Cir. 2004). 
65 See id. 
66 See id. 
67 Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme (Yahoo! IV), 433 F.3d 1199, 
1201 (9th Cir. 2006). 
68 See Margaret Khayat Bratt & Norbert F. Kugele, Who’s in Charge? Mich. B.J., July, 
2001, at 43. 
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content caused increased concerns over regulating Cyberspace.69 At-
tempts at regulating the Internet, however, have proven problematic 
because of the decentralized nature of the Web and fears of inhibiting 
a rapidly growing engine of global commerce and communication.70 
Nevertheless, at least four prominent theoretical models of Internet 
regulation have emerged: (1) the self-regulation model; (2) the neo-
mercantilist model; (3) the culturalist model; and (4) the globalism 
model.71 
 The self-regulation model insists that the Internet community is 
capable of regulating itself and promulgation of domestic or interna-
tional laws would be both unnecessary and undesirable.72 Self-regu-
lation is likely rooted in the ideals of the “Free Software Movement” 
starting in the 1980s within the Internet/Hi-tech industry, which was 
characterized by the free exchange of proprietary information for the 
purpose of advancing the art through public collaboration.73 The Inter-
net has become the primary conduit for such free communication, and 
attempts at regulating it have traditionally faced sharp criticism from the 
online community.74 One Internet commentator illustrated the views of 
many in the online community stating: 
Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of 
flesh and steel, I come from Cyberspace, the new home of 
Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask you of the past to leave 
us alone. You are not welcome among us. You have no sover-
eignty where we gather. 
. . . Where there are real conflicts, where there are wrongs, 
we will identify them and address them by our means. We are 
forming our own Social Contract. This governance will arise 
according to the conditions of our world, not yours. Our 
world is different.75 
                                                                                                                      
69 See Spencer Kass, Regulation and the Internet, 26 S.U. L. Rev. 93, 93 (1998). 
70 See id. 
71 See Love, supra note 36, at 271. 
72 See Lyombe Eko, Many Spiders, One Worldwide Web: Towards a Typology of Internet Regu-
lation, 6 Comm. L. & Pol’y 445, 451 (2001). 
73 See Karl Fogel, What Is Free Software, Sept. 29, 2005, http://www.onlamp.com/pub/a/ 
onlamp/2005/09/29/what-is-free-software.html. 
74 See generally Elec. Frontier Found. (EEF), About EFF, http://www.eff.org/about/ (last 
visited May 14, 2007) (advocating various online freedoms from privacy to use of copyrighted 
materials). 
75 John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, EFF, 1996, http:// 
homes.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html. 
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 As the Internet began to grow in the late 1990s, the self-
regulation model appeared to receive acceptance from certain gov-
ernments, particularly the United States.76 In fact, the Clinton-Gore 
administration called for governments to “refrain from imposing new 
and unnecessary regulations, bureaucratic procedures, or taxes and 
tariffs on commercial activities that take place via the Internet.”77 The 
self-regulation model, however, is not universally accepted,78 and 
“[m]ost countries regulate the Internet within the framework of their 
political, legal, moral and cultural values.”79 
 Neo-mercantilism, the second theoretical model of Internet regu-
lation, “combines several libertarian principles—the marketplace of 
ideas, laissez-faire economics, free trade and the free flow of informa-
tion, goods and services—and applies them to the Internet, thereby 
making them global concepts.”80 The underlying premise of the model 
is that the Internet is essentially a vehicle of commerce.81 The role of 
government, therefore, is to ensure the free flow of commerce along 
the information superhighway and to remove any impediments.82 This 
model is considered to be the American approach to Internet regula-
tion.83 
 In contrast, the culturalist model views cultural protection as the 
primary objective of Internet regulation.84 Governments adhering to 
this model tend to “enact Internet laws and policies rooted in the spe-
cific intellectual, aesthetic and moral values of their national or re-
gional civilizations or cultures, with little consideration of their extra-
territorial or global impact.”85 Culturalist governments often perceive 
Internet content not as neutral, but serving the interest of its country 
of origin, which in most cases is the United States.86 The cultural ho-
mogeneity of the Internet is thus believed to be a potential cause of 
global cultural impoverishment.87 
                                                                                                                      
76 See Eko, supra note 72, at 450. 
77 See William J. Clinton & Albert Gore, Jr., Technology Administration, De-
partment of Commerce, A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce (1997), 
available at http://www.technology.gov/digeconomy/framewrk.htm. 
78 See Love, supra note 36, at 271. 
79 Eko, supra note 72, at 461. 
80 Id. at 463–64. 
81 See id. at 464. 
82 See id. 
83 See id. 
84 Eko, supra note 72, at 465. 
85 Id. at 466. 
86 See id. at 467. 
87 See id. 
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 The French orders in the Yahoo! case illustrate a culturalist per-
spective.88 That court was primarily concerned with protecting French 
surfers from viewing websites that “violated French law by ‘offending 
the collective memory of the country.’”89 The court seemed to dismiss 
the compliance costs imposed on Yahoo! and failed to address the 
implications of the extraterritorial effects of its orders.90 
 Lastly, the globalism model requires multinational political, eco-
nomic, technological, and cultural cooperation in regulating the Inter-
net.91 This model relies on treaties and international conventions to 
achieve that goal.92 Although international regulation of intellectual 
property and child pornography on the Internet has made some pro-
gress,93 there are no international agreements resolving Internet juris-
diction.94 
B. Proposed Solutions to the Internet Jurisdiction Problem 
1. A Res Communes Solution 
 One solution to the Internet jurisdiction problem is to declare cy-
berspace a new global space or Common Heritage of Mankind 
(CHM).95 This solution reflects many of the underlying policies of the 
self-regulation model; however, the international community, instead of 
the Internet community, would resolve the jurisdictional issues by regu-
lating the Internet through treaties and norms rather than applying 
traditional jurisdiction doctrines.96 
 CHM is grounded in the res communes doctrine that “all nations 
should benefit from the resources that are recovered from areas in 
which all nations have an interest.”97 The High Seas, Antarctica, and 
Outer Space are all regulated by treaties and international conventions 
as CHM.98 A CHM cannot be appropriated; rather, all states share the 
                                                                                                                      
88 See id. at 471. 
89 Eko, supra note 72, at 471. 
90 See Tribunal de grande instance [T.G.I.] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, 
Nov. 20, 2000, available at http://www.cdt.org/speech/international/20001120 yahoofrance. 
pdf (Fr.). 
91 See Eko, supra note 72, at 463. 
92 See id. 
93 See id. 
94 See Gerlach, supra note 1, at 901–02. 
95 See Love, supra note 36, at 273; Heaven, supra note 33, at 400. 
96 See Love, supra note 36, at 273. 
97 Heaven, supra note 33, at 390. 
98 See id. at 391. 
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burden of managing a CHM’s resources and the benefits of its exploita-
tion.99 Those resources must also be preserved for future generations, 
and a CHM can only be utilized for peaceful purposes.100 
 Advocates of a res communes solution to the Internet jurisdiction 
problem envision a comprehensive international regulatory scheme.101 
An international convention would lead to a treaty setting forth “uni-
versal standards” and declaring the Internet CHM.102 The treaty would 
also create an international body that would promulgate civil and 
criminal Internet regulations and jurisdictional rules.103 Advocates ar-
gue that regulations drafted pursuant to the treaty must be adopted by 
all nations without reservations or modifications, and individual na-
tions would be required to insert these regulations into their domestic 
legal codes.104 
 The clear advantage of international Internet regulation is uni-
formity.105 Courts would no longer have the discretion of deciding 
whether their laws or the laws of another nation apply in a given 
case.106 Moreover, the enforcement of foreign judgments would not 
violate domestic laws because the laws regulating the Internet would 
be the same in all countries.107 Users and providers of Internet ser-
vices and content would be afforded the certainty of knowing that 
their conduct is regulated by a single set of globally applicable laws.108 
In addition, proponents argue that a user or provider who violates a 
universal Internet regulation would simply be prosecuted in their 
home jurisdiction because, at least in theory, the outcome would be 
the same in all jurisdictions and the defendant’s home jurisdiction 
would be the most convenient forum.109 
                                                                                                                      
99 See id. 
100 See id. 
101 See id. at 400. 
102 See Heaven, supra note 33, at 390. 
103 See id. at 400. 
104 See id.; Love, supra note 36, at 273–74. 
105 See Love, supra note 36, at 274. 
106 See id. 
107 See id. 
108 See id. 
109 See Heaven, supra note 33, at 401. Although Heaven argues uniform laws would 
make jurisdictional issues easier in the context of criminal violations, she acknowledges 
that the question of civil jurisdiction is not as readily resolved. See id. Even in the criminal 
context, however, there would likely be significant debate over whether sovereign rights of 
the defendant’s nation to protect its citizens should trump the sovereign right of the vic-
tim’s nation to protect its citizens and to prosecute crimes occurring or having substantial 
effects within its borders. It is unclear whether declaring the Internet res communes would 
remove from consideration these deeply engrained principles of sovereignty. 
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 A universal regulatory scheme may have great appeal, but even 
supporters of a res communes solution to Internet regulation admit that 
it will be a “daunting task . . . coaxing sovereign nations into giving up 
territorial rights” over the commercial and intellectual resources of 
the Internet.110 Proponents, however, contend that the challenges of 
establishing an Internet CHM are both necessary and doable.111 
2. A Global Standard for Determining Jurisdiction 
 Another proposal involves establishing a global standard for de-
termining jurisdiction in Internet cases.112 Similar to the res communes 
solution, the global standardization approach to Internet jurisdiction 
requires an international convention or treaty.113 It would, however 
stop short of declaring the Internet CHM and formulating substantive 
Internet regulations.114 Specifically, proponents of global standardiza-
tion desire the international adoption of a single test for determining 
Internet jurisdiction.115 Several tests have been proposed to resolve the 
Internet jurisdiction problem including: (1) the accessibility test;116 (2) 
the Zippo test;117 (3) the effects test;118 and (4) the targeting test.119 
 The Zippo test determines whether jurisdiction may be properly 
asserted based on “the nature and quality of the commercial activity” 
conducted over the Internet.120 This test involves evaluating the rele-
vant Internet activity and placing it into one of three categories falling 
along a sliding scale.121 “At one end of the spectrum are situations 
where a defendant clearly does business over the Internet.”122 Jurisdic-
tion in these cases would be proper.123 “At the opposite end are situa-
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tions where a defendant has simply posted information on an Internet 
Web site which is accessible to users in foreign jurisdictions.”124 Assert-
ing jurisdiction over these “passive Web sites” would be improper.125 
“The middle ground is occupied by interactive Web sites where a user 
can exchange information with the host computer. In these cases, the 
exercise of jurisdiction is determined by the level of interactivity and 
commercial nature of the exchange of information that occurs on the 
Web site.”126 While many U.S. courts have applied the Zippo test,127 it 
appears to be fading in popularity.128 
 Rather than focusing on the interactivity of the defendant’s web-
site, some courts determine Internet jurisdiction based on whether the 
conduct “has an effect in the forum state.”129 A simplified example of 
this test is demonstrated in the Tribunal De Grande Instance De Paris’ 
holding in the Yahoo! case: “Whereas the damage was suffered in 
France, our jurisdiction is therefore competent.”130 In the United 
States, the effects test is grounded in the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Calder v. Jones that jurisdiction is proper where the defendant’s inten-
tional conduct was calculated to cause injury in the forum state.131 
Courts may invoke the effects test to assert jurisdiction in cases where 
the facts would be insufficient under the Zippo test.132 Applying an ef-
fects test, by itself, however, has been criticized as potentially exposing 
websites to liability anywhere in the world.133 
 The targeting test offers a narrower and more flexible standard.134 
Under this test, courts determine whether the defendant website tar-
geted the jurisdiction by considering the steps taken by the defendant 
to enter or avoid the particular forum state.135 The question of whether 
the defendant targeted the jurisdiction is itself a vague standard.136 
                                                                                                                      
124 Id. 
125 Zippo Mfg., 952 F. Supp. at 1124. 
126 Id. 
127 See, e.g., Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 419 (9th Cir. 1997); Am. Eye-
wear, Inc. v. Peeper’s Sunglasses & Accessories, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d 895, 900–01 (N.D. 
Tex. 2000). 
128 See Hestermeyer, supra note 7, at 278. 
129 Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 144 F.3d 1316, 1321 (9th Cir. 1998). 
130 Tribunal de grande instance [T.G.I.] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, 
May 22, 2000, Interim Order No. 00/05308, available at http://www.juriscom.net/txt/ 
jurisfr/cti/yauctions20000522.htm (Fr.). 
131 See 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984). 
132 See Rice, supra note 5, at 477–78. 
133 See Hestermeyer, supra note 7, at 286. 
134 See id. 
135 See id. at 279. 
136 See id. 
2008] International Internet Jurisdiction 359 
Commentators, however, suggest that courts, in applying the targeting 
test, should consider the totality of the circumstances or develop a non-
exhaustive list of factors.137 The suggested factors include the languages 
used, the currencies accepted, disclaimers, the use of geo-location tech-
nologies, the top-level domain used,138 pictorial suggestions, advertis-
ing, and market participation.139 The targeting test has been applied in 
the United States140 and elsewhere.141 
3. Content Filtering & E-Borders 
 Many commentators view the Internet jurisdiction problem as one 
of weakened national borders.142 Some have argued that the Internet 
has created a borderless society because the Internet lacks a physical 
location.143 This argument, however, is largely inaccurate.144 “Internet 
communication begins ‘from a fixed location and ends at a fixed loca-
tion.’”145 Proponents of content filtering argue that filtering technolo-
gies can be placed within this infrastructure to create e-borders.146 
 The Internet jurisdiction problem, from the content filtering per-
spective, results from the large volume of unmonitored Internet traffic 
crossing international borders.147 Governments would regain control of 
their borders by placing blocking and tracking technologies at interna-
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tional access points or at the Internet Service Provider’s (ISP) servers to 
act as centurions.148 Many governments have already implemented 
such technologies to monitor and regulate Internet activities of their 
citizens.149 In an ironic twist on the Yahoo! case, Yahoo!, Google, and 
Microsoft have been criticized for filtering their search results in China 
for terms such as “democracy” and “human rights.”150 
 There are four basic forms of content filtering: Host Name Block-
ing; IP Address Blocking;151 Keyword Blocking; and Content-Based Im-
age Blocking.152 The first two, Host Name Blocking and IP Address 
Blocking, are the simplest filtering methods because they only check 
the web address and not the entire site.153 Host Name Blocking restricts 
access to web addresses containing banned terms.154 IP Address Block-
ing restricts access to sites based on a list of banned IP addresses com-
piled by the filter manager, or it can restrict user access to a pre-
approved list of websites, called Whitelist Filters.155 Keyword Blocking is 
similar to Host Name Blocking; however, its scope is much greater be-
cause Keyword Blocking searches the entire site for banned terms.156 
Content-Based Image Filtering scans images displayed on websites.157 
 Proponents of content filtering view it as a more realistic solution 
to the Internet jurisdiction problem than attempting to get the world 
to agree on a single set of universal regulations and jurisdictional stan-
dards.158 Moreover, Internet filtering allows states to erect e-borders 
and regulate the Internet activity of its citizens without having an im-
pact on foreign users or content providers.159 Critics, however, argue 
that the filtering approach unduly restricts the free flow of information 
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for which the Internet was created.160 In addition, many have echoed 
Yahoo!’s argument that filtering technology is easily circumvented or in 
itself largely ineffective.161 Nevertheless, at least twenty countries cur-
rently impose significant filtering restrictions on Internet access.162 
4. Choice of Law Provisions 
 Another solution to the Internet jurisdiction problem is to allow 
content providers and users to agree to resolve disputes in a particular 
forum via choice of law provisions in terms of service contracts.163 For 
example, the content provider could require users to consent to a 
terms of service agreement containing a forum selection clause as a 
condition for entering the site.164 These provisions would be valid if: 
(1) “the chosen law and forum are clearly disclosed to the consumer”; 
(2) “the chosen forum is reasonably accessible and neutral”; and (3) 
“the chosen law provides reasonable, baseline consumer protec-
tions.”165 The choice of law approach could also result in the develop-
ment of new forms of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) specifically 
tailored for the unique contours of the Internet.166 
 The choice of law solution draws heavily from the self-regulation 
and neo-mercantilist models in that it relies primarily on private order-
ing rather than governmental or international regulation.167 The only 
external regulation appears to be the establishment of an international 
consensus regarding the validity of such agreements; however, given the 
European Union’s reluctance to allow forum selection clauses, such a 
consensus does not seem likely.168 
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III. Analysis 
A. The Global Internet Commons: Unfounded and Impractical 
 The solution of declaring the Internet CHM is certainly appealing. 
It would attempt to create a utopian global common in which persons 
from around the world could exchange information, ideas, goods, and 
services. Unfortunately, the res communes solution suffers from a host of 
failures, both practical and theoretical. First, the theoretical support for 
declaring the Internet CHM, such as the Moon Treaty and the Outer 
Space Treaty, is very weak.169 Second, drafting a single set of Internet 
regulations is likely too ambitious, and might even prove more prob-
lematic than helpful.170 Third, the solution would take an incredible 
amount of time to implement and modify because it would necessarily 
require the participation and ratification of every nation on earth.171 
Lastly, it would require states to relinquish their sovereign authority 
over Internet activities that are entirely domestic and have no interna-
tional effects or implications. 
 The Outer Space Treaty and Moon Treaty are extremely weak 
authority to support declaring the Internet CHM.172 International 
participation in CHM treaties falls well short of the global ratification 
required for an Internet CHM to be successful.173 In addition, these 
treaties tend to promulgate aspirational goals concerning the use of 
resources that are extremely difficult or expensive to exploit, whereas 
proponents of an Internet CHM envision a comprehensive regulatory 
scheme.174 Furthermore, the aspiration of peaceful and environmen-
tally friendly space exploration has hardly been successful.175 In sum, 
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existing CHM treaties have not demonstrated the feasibility of creat-
ing a universal set of concrete, binding Internet regulations.176 
 Additionally, the international regulatory regime envisioned by 
CHM proponents attempts too much. As previous CHM treaties have 
shown, it is an extremely daunting task to get all nations to ratify such a 
treaty.177 Even proponents admit that certain legal issues (e.g., issues 
over which countries are in sharp disagreement) would have to remain 
unaddressed by the initial treaty in order to gain universal support.178 
Many hotly debated jurisdictional issues, however, are those that are in 
the most critical need of resolution, such as freedom of expression179 
and validity of forum selection clauses.180 Further complicating matters, 
the CHM solution would also attempt to promulgate substantive regula-
tions.181 CHM proponents fail to see that nearly all Internet activities 
have real world analogs, such as libel,182 breach of contract,183 intellec-
tual property infringement,184 identity theft, fraud,185 pedophilia, 
drugs,186 and product liability.187 International Internet regulators 
would thus need to create an international rule for nearly every crimi-
nal and civil action available anywhere in the world.188 
 Even if the CHM regulators were successful in getting every nation 
to adopt universal Internet rules, two significant concerns would likely 
arise. First, there would be conflicts between these universal Internet 
regulations and the domestic laws regulating the same activities. For 
example, if domestic libel laws differed from Internet libel regulation, 
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then a newspaper publisher and an Internet blogger might receive dif-
ferent treatments in the same court. Second, because states themselves 
have struggled with Internet issues, there is no reason to believe the 
international community would fare much better.189 The Internet is a 
relatively new and constantly evolving medium, further decreasing the 
odds that an international convention could formulate a satisfactory set 
of standards.190 
 Timing is another factor that works against a CHM solution.191 By 
the time the convention is able to draft regulations on which all nations 
can agree, Internet use may have evolved to the point where the regula-
tions are obsolete before they are even ratified.192 If, for whatever rea-
son, the CHM regulations turn out to be faulty, the international com-
munity would be essentially locked into those poor standards.193 In 
short, a CHM solution is too stodgy for the rapid pace of Internet activ-
ity.194 
 Lastly, the CHM solution would require courts to follow interna-
tional standards in cases that in no way concern the international 
community. For example, there seems to be little reason for interna-
tional standards of jurisdiction to apply in a case where an American 
plaintiff sues an American defendant for libel over the Internet. Sover-
eign nations have the right to create their own laws and enforce them 
within their borders and amongst their citizens.195 
B. Targeting an International Standard for Internet Jurisdiction 
 As discussed above, courts have applied several Internet jurisdic-
tion tests; however, many commentators view the targeting test as the 
best.196 An international convention solution might, therefore, adopt 
the targeting test as a global standard for determining international 
Internet jurisdiction or, at least, use it as a starting point for developing 
a new standard.197 In addition, an international convention solution 
                                                                                                                      
189 See Spataro, supra note 168, part II(1). 
190 See id. 
191 See id. 
192 See id. 
193 See id. 
194 See Spataro, supra note 168, part II(1). 
195 See Gerlach, supra note 1, at 912. 
196 See, e.g., Michael Geist, Is There a There There? Toward Greater Certainty for Internet Ju-
risdiction, 16 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1345, 1380 (2001); Hestermeyer, supra note 7, at 286; 
Lester, supra note 145, at 465. 
197 See Hestermeyer, supra note 7, at 286. 
2008] International Internet Jurisdiction 365 
might incorporate the targeting test with other provisions, such as fil-
tering.198 
 Of course, the adoption of a single standard for determining juris-
diction in Internet cases suffers from many of the same failings as the 
res communes solution; however, an international convention that is lim-
ited to jurisdictional issues is far less ambitious and time consuming 
than declaring the Internet CHM.199 Adopting a targeting standard, or 
something similar, alleviates concerns about being locked200 into a in-
adequate universal standard because such a test would consider the to-
tality of the circumstances under a list of non-exhaustive factors, 
thereby providing flexibility to adapt to changes in Internet uses.201 
C. Content Filtering: Inadequacies and Other Concerns 
 The question to ask is not whether governments and private enti-
ties are going to use filtering and monitoring technologies—that has 
already been answered in the affirmative.202 Countries such as Saudi 
Arabia, Singapore, and China, have already implemented filtering and 
monitoring technologies in their Internet infrastructures.203 Other 
countries, such as Britain, Russia, and the United States, have taken 
steps to monitor Internet activities.204 These examples demonstrate the 
increasing desire of states to regulate Internet activities within their 
borders and suggest that filtering and monitoring technologies will 
continue to play a role in such regulation.205 The more difficult ques-
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tions concerning these technologies are whether they are effective206 
and whether they are appropriate.207 
 The efficacy of filtering technologies suffers from two significant 
problems. First, the technologies themselves currently lack the accuracy 
to create a completely effective e-border; however, proponents argue 
that advancements in technology will resolve these issues.208 Second, 
filtering and monitoring technologies are currently engaged in “a bat-
tle at the level of the architecture” with privacy technologies that cir-
cumvent filters and cloak their users’ identities and locations.209 Al-
though governments using filtering and monitoring technologies have 
targeted privacy-protection sites, those sites have, so far, been able to 
develop new strategies to stay ahead of blocking technologies.210 
 The technology war between governments and privacy-protection 
companies reflects the theoretical battle over whether Internet regu-
lation is a good idea in general.211 Those in favor of filtering contend 
that the Internet is a lawless medium, and these technologies are nec-
essary to protect national security, intellectual property rights, and 
cultural and religious values.212 Opponents argue that filtering tech-
nologies infringe on civil liberties and stifle global communication.213 
Critics point to restrictive regimes, such as China and Saudi Arabia, as 
evidence of filtering’s negative impact on human rights.214 They fail, 
however, to explain why online speech deserves unique protections 
that would not be afforded to similar speech in newspapers, televi-
sion, or radio.215 Although the human rights and economic issues re-
garding filtering and monitoring technologies should concern the 
international community, keeping these issues separate from Internet 
jurisdiction would better facilitate the resolution of the latter. 
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D. Online Forum Shopping 
 The validity of choice of forum contracts has long been a hotly de-
bated issue.216 The European Union has taken the stance that forum 
selection clauses are null and void in business-to-consumer contracts.217 
In the United States, however, courts acknowledge that “agreeing in 
advance on a forum acceptable to both parties is an indispensable ele-
ment in international trade, commerce, and contracting.”218 Because of 
this disagreement, it is unlikely that a solution to the Internet jurisdic-
tion problem would include a provision permitting forum selection 
clauses in terms of service or online purchase agreements, at least in 
the context of a business-to-consumer contracts.219 Forum selection 
clauses contained in high value business-to-business contracts, however, 
should be presumed valid because, at some point, the value of goods or 
services exchanged in the transaction indicates a level of sophistication 
sufficient to contract away such rights.220 Furthermore, the interna-
tional Internet community should not be deterred from utilizing other 
common forms of ADR, such as credit card chargebacks.221 In addition, 
the private sector should try and develop other informal, quick, and 
inexpensive forms of ADR to handle Internet disputes that would be 
more appealing to Internet users than traditional litigation.222 
E. A Proposal for an International Internet Convention 
 Despite the variety of solutions currently available, questions con-
cerning international Internet jurisdiction remain unresolved223 and 
continue to be a concern, particularly to content providers.224 The rea-
son for the deadlock concerning Internet jurisdiction could reflect the 
fact that, as noted above, each of the most common solutions have sig-
nificant drawbacks.225 Moreover, common ground is difficult to find 
because each of the common solutions are founded in starkly different 
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principles of Internet regulation.226 Nevertheless, the Internet’s global 
scope makes it necessary for the international community to formulate 
universal standards for determining jurisdiction in Internet disputes.227 
 A convention on international Internet jurisdiction could achieve 
a global consensus on Internet jurisdiction with participation and rati-
fication by every country.228 Although universal ratification will no 
doubt be very difficult, a convention limited to jurisdictional issues 
would be an easier sell than an attempt to completely carve out and 
regulate a new international space.229 Furthermore, over time a con-
vention ratified by a majority of states could still become binding cus-
tomary law.230 The convention should strongly consider adopting some 
version of the targeting test because it is flexible and has been success-
fully applied in several jurisdictions.231 A targeting test considers steps 
taken by content providers to avoid the jurisdiction, thus reducing the 
likelihood that content providers will be forced to litigate in unforeseen 
jurisdictions.232 In formulating its targeting test, the convention should 
identify a number of factors it considers of high probative value, such as 
the use of disclaimers, filtering technology, and the accepted forms of 
currency.233 The convention might consider whether forum selection 
clauses should be presumed valid in the context of high value transac-
tions between sophisticated businesses.234 The convention should avoid 
highly contentious issues, such as business-consumer choice of forum 
agreements, substantive Internet regulations, and the appropriateness 
of nation-level content filtering and Internet monitoring.235 
Conclusion 
 The lack of clear standards for determining jurisdiction in Inter-
net cases is an international problem requiring an international solu-
tion. Although achieving full participation and ratification by every na-
tion will likely be an extremely difficult task, no other viable solutions 
are available. A convention on international Internet jurisdiction is nec-
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essary to clarify the expectations of the Internet community. Currently, 
content providers could be sued anywhere and everywhere for uninten-
tionally violating domestic laws they never knew existed. Similarly, 
Internet users must surf the web without any certainty that redress is 
available for harms they might suffer in cyberspace. The international 
community should not allow this jurisdictional void to continue, and a 
universal standard for determining international Internet jurisdiction 
based on the targeting test should be adopted. 
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